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Treatises and casebooks on constitutional law do not devote much attention to bankruptcy. This scholarly neglect is reciprocated in treatises and casebooks on bankruptcy,
which contain only limited references to constitutional aspects of the subject. The role
of bankruptcy law in our national economy and social policy is nevertheless of greater
significance than it is in any other country in the world. The constitutional status of
bankruptcy legislation and its administration is basic to the influential part it plays in
our national life.

Bankruptcy at the Constitutional Convention

by Frank R. Kennedy
The fallowing article is excerpted from
a chapter in Blessings of Liberty - The
Constitution and the Practice of Law,
published in 1988 by the American Law
Institute, American Bar Association
Committee on Continuing Professional
Education; reprinted by permission.
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The subject of bankruptcy was not considered until late in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and even then it was not extensively discussed. On August 29, 1787,
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved to add to the full faith and credit clause a
provision "to establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcy" and a provision
respecting damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange. Pinckney's proposal came after a discussion on the Convention floor of the question whether a state
insolvency act should be treated like a state court judgment. At least one delegate to the
Convention had represented clients in litigation presenting the question whether a discharge granted in one state was binding on the courts of another state. On September I ,
1787, three days after Pinckney's motion, John Rutledge of South Carolina recommended that the article on the Legislative Department include "after the power 'to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States,' a power 'to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy'." Two days later, on September 3,
1787, the proposed clause was adopted with "practically no debate." The only negative
vote was that of Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who objected to the grant of a power
that would permit the punishment of bankruptcy by death as under the early laws of
England. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania acknowledged that bankruptcy was "an
extensive and delicate subject," but he "saw no danger of abuse by the legislature of
the United States." The Report of the Committee on Style and the final draft of the
Constitution inserted the bankruptcy clause immediately after the grant of the power to
regulate commerce as clause 4 of section 8 of Article I.

In The Federalist (No. 42), James Madison declared that "[t]he power of establishing
uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or
be removed into different States that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn
into question." This commentary suggests that a principal consideration in the Convention's ready acceptance of the grant of the bankruptcy power was the concern that
creditors might be subjected to diverse and discriminatory state laws and decisions.

The Meaning and Scope of "Laws on the Subject of
Bankruptcies"
For the first 146 years of our history, challenges to the constitutionality of bankruptcy
legislation were typically viewed and resolved on the basis of a consideration of the
meaning and scope of the bankruptcy clause without reference to possible limitations
imposed by other provisions of the Constitution or its amendments. Thus it was argued
successfully for the first 50 years that the clause authorized bankruptcy proceedings
only against traders commenced by creditors. The New York Constitutional Convention
in 1788 proposed an amendment to the federal Constitution to limit the federal bankruptcy power to the enactment of laws applicable to merchants and other traders and
to authorize the states to enact laws for the relief of other insolvent debtors. It was
not until the Act of 1841 that Congress authorized voluntary as well as involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings and that nontraders were made eligible for bankruptcy relief.
The constitutionality of the Act of 1841 was given a ringing judicial endorsement by
Justice Catron on circuit in In re Klein, 14 E Cas. 716 (C.C.D.Mo. 1843) (No. 7865).
The opinion has been much quoted and has exerted a strong influence in assuring hospitable treatment of bankruptcy legislation when challenged as exceeding the bounds
of the constitutional grant. Justice Catron's opinion included the following expansive
description of the potential scope of the bankruptcy power of Congress:
"I hold [the bankruptcy power] extends to all cases where the law causes
to be distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its
least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts. And
all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending to
further the great end of the subject - distribution and discharge - are in
the competency and discretion of Congress."
The provision of the Act of 1841 for discharge of voluntary bankrupts was a focus
for attacks not only on its constitutionality in the courts but also on its economic and
social wisdom in the press and in Congress. The attacks succeeded in bringing about
the repeal of the Act in 1843. In consequence the constitutionality of the Act was never
addressed by the Supreme Court. Thousands of voluntary bankrupts were nevertheless
discharged pursuant to the Act of 1841.
Although arguments against the constitutionality of authorizing discharge of
nontraders surfaced in Congress from time to time up to the Civil War whenever
bankruptcy legislation was proposed, these arguments posed no obstacle to enactment
of liberal provisions for eligibility and discharge of voluntary bankrupts in 1867.
An amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 made in 1874 provided for a composition that would bind a minority of nonconsenting creditors. The amendment raised and
survived challenges on the floor of Congress and ultimately in the courts. In a seminal
opinion upholding the constitutionality of the 1874 amendment, District Judge
Blatchford declared that
"[t]he subject of bankruptcies .. .. is not, properly, anything less than the
subject of the relations between an insolvent or non-paying or fraudulent
debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and their relief."

41

The rationale upholding the constitutionality of the 1874 amendment was invoked
six decades later to sustain the validity of reorganization legislation that permitted
discharge or adjustment of secured as well as unsecured debt without liquidation or
surrender of assets to creditors. Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act was upheld by a
unanimous opinion in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railway Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935), that emphasized the capacity of
the bankruptcy clause to meet "new conditions as they have been disclosed as a result
of the tremendous growth of business and development of human activities from
1800 to the present day. [T]he power of Congress under the bankruptcy clause,"
said the Court, "is not to be limited by the English or Colonial law in force when
the Constitution was adopted . . . ."
The Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973, which supplemented Section 77, was upheld by the Court in 1974 as "another step in the direction of liberalizing the law on
the subject of bankruptcies." Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. (Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases), 419 U.S. 102, 153 (1974). The Railroad Reorganization Act
created the United States Railway Association, gave it authority to prepare a system for
restructuring railroads to be reorganized, provided for the transfer of rail properties to
a new corporate entity in return for its securities, and guaranteed all obligations of the
United States Railway Association by the United States.
This review of Supreme Court rulings on the permissible scope of the laws on the
subject of bankruptcies discloses a strong disinclination to give a strict or rigid reading
of the bankruptcy clause. Charles Warren, whose Bankruptcy in United States History
was published in 1935, was able to make this sweeping survey of the judicial interpretation of the clause:
"The trail of that Clause is strewn with a host of unsuccessful objections
based on constitutional grounds against the enactment of various provisions, all of which are now regarded as perfectly orthodox features of a
bankruptcy law. Thus, it was at first contended that, constitutionally, such
a law must be confined to the lines of the English statute; next, that it could
not discharge prior contracts; next, that a purely voluntary law would be
non-uniform and therefore unconstitutional; next, that any voluntary bankruptcy was unconstitutional; that there could be no discharge of debts of
any class except traders; next, that a bankruptcy law could not apply to corporations; next, that allowance of State exemptions of property would make
a bankruptcy law nonuniform; next, that any composition was unconstitutional; next, that there could be no composition without an adjudication in
bankruptcy; next, that there could be no sale of mortgaged property free
from the mortgage. All these objections, so hotly and frequently asserted
from period to period, were overcome either by public opinion or by
the court."

The record of adjudications of constitutionality was soon broken after publication of
Warren's History. The Supreme Court has since held four, arguably five, bankruptcy
laws unconstitutional, 1 yet none has been invalidated on the ground that it falls outside
the scope of the "subject of bankruptcies." In view of the acknowledged exercise of the
bankruptcy power to authorize bankruptcy relief by and against entities that were not
eligible or amenable under English or Colonial laws in or prior to 1787 and in view
of the novel forms of relief made available by various bankruptcy acts, the history of
the construction of the bankruptcy clause seems to be a paradigmatic illustration of
departure from "the original intent of the Constitution." Nonetheless Professor Kurt
Nadelmann concluded 30 years ago after a study of the origin of the bankruptcy clause
that " [c ]ontemporaries of the drafters of the Constitution had no doubts as to the broad
reading to be given to the Bankruptcy Clause."

• Louisl'ille Joint State land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (invalidating section 75(s) of the Bankruplcy Act as enacted in 1934); Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Jmpro..ement District No . / , 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (invalidating Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Acl as enacted in 1934);
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe line Co .. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invalidating 28 U.S.C. section 147l(c) as enacled in 1978);
Rail~ay labor Executiv.S Assn v. Gibbons. 455 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act
of 1980). A fifth case that arguably should be included in the list of rulings against constitutionality is United States v. Security Industrial Bank.

459 U.S. 70 (1982), construing section 522(0(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 not to apply to preenactment security agreements so as 10
avoid doubts as to the constitutionality of such application.
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A recent critic of the decisions of the Supreme Court that have involved the
Fifth Amendment as a basis for limiting what Congress can do in the exercise of its
bankruptcy power observed that
".. . there may have been far more wisdom than is now generally recognized in the concentration of nineteenth century lawyers and judges on
specifying the scope of the powers implicit in the constitutional grant to
Congress of authority over the subject of bankruptcies .... [T]he shift of
emphasis from the bankruptcy clause to the fifth amendment may be but
one manifestation of the abandonment of any serious effort to regard government ... as having only specific granted powers whose scope is limited
by the terms of the explicit or implicit grant .. .. "Rogers, The Impairment
of Secured Creditors Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship
Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
973, 1031 (1983).
The argument that focus on the scope of the bankruptcy power is preferable to a concern with the limitations on its exercise by the amendments is a plea for according
nearly conclusive effect to Congressional enactments on the subject of bankruptcy.
When the variety of the provisions enacted by Congress and the frequency and range
of attacks on their constitutionality are considered, it must be concluded that the courts
have indeed come close to permitting Congress complete freedom in formulating and
enacting bankruptcy legislation.
Shortly after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, James Monroe Olmstead
lambasted its debtor-oriented provisions, declaring that "the rehabilitation theory was
farthest from the minds of the framers of the Constitution." Bankruptcy a Commercial
Regulation, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 835 (1902). In retrospect, however, scholarly criticism of the legislative and judicial views of the scope of the bankruptcy clause has
been desultory.

The Meaning of Uniform Laws on the Subject of
Bankruptcies
James Madison's statement in The Federalist quoted earlier regarding the purpose
of the bankruptcy clause emphasizes the need for uniformity in the settlement of the
financial affairs of debtors in distress. It has never been assumed, however, that the
rules governing contracts, torts, property, and other rights and duties of debtors and
creditors that underlie the disputes that must be resolved in bankruptcy must be nationally uniform. The contrary assumption would require the enactment of a whole body of
substantive federal law at variance with the diverse state laws that govern the affairs of
debtors and creditors prior to the onset of bankruptcy. The magnitude of the task of formulating such a comprehensive code, the manifest inconvenience and dislocations that
would be entailed by establishing a federal law overriding all inconsistent state law for
the purpose of bankruptcy administration, and the serious threat to the functioning of
the federal system posed by a proposal for such a federal code all have served to deter
any serious move toward a general displacement of state law by federal rules for application in bankruptcy. The rules governing exemptions to be allowed to bankrupts were
nevertheless thought to be so integral a part of any bankruptcy law that fears or doubts
as to the constitutionality of incorporating state exemptions into bankruptcy legislation
deterred Congress from enacting any federal exemption provisions prior to 1867.
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, most state legislatures had already provided their domiciliaries a detailed list of exemptions, including a homestead,
that could be protected from creditors' levy. Shortly after the end of the Civil War, state
constitutions and statutes were extensively amended to enlarge allowable exemptions,
and Congress in 1872 amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 to authorize the allowance
of exemptions in conformity with the 1871 laws of bankrupts' domiciles. Many of the
amendments were vulnerable to attack by creditors holding preenactment claims, in
that the enlargement of the exemptions arguably impaired the obligations of their contracts in violation of section 10 of Article I. Congress nevertheless declared that the
state amendments should be effective for the benefit of bankrupts with respect to prior
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as well as subsequent debts. Chief Justice Waite, sitting as a circuit justice, held that
the 1874 amendment rendered the Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional for nonuniformity.
In re Deckert, 7 Fed. Cas. 334 (No. 3728) (C.C.E.D.Va. 1874). As his opinion pointed
out, state laws governed the allowance of exemptions to the bankrupt domiciliaries of
some states whereas in other states the federal law made state exemption laws retroactively applicable in bankruptcy although not effective against prior creditors under
state law. The result was neither geographic uniformity among the several states nor
uniformity within each of the states. Four decades later the Supreme Court h~ld the
1874 amendment to be inoperative on questionable grounds but without adverting to
the fact that it imposed a nonuniform rule governing th~ allowance of exemptions.
Kener v. LaGrange Mills, 231 U.S. 215, 218 (1913).
In the meantime Congress had enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which incorporated by reference in section 6 the diverse exemption laws of the domiciliary states of
bankrupts. The section was quickly challenged as violative of the constitutional mandate of uniformity in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). The Court
acknowledged that the Constitution required "geographical" uniformity but said that
section 6 was not "incompatible with the rule." The Court then and later regarded
conformity of the substantive law applied in a bankruptcy case to the state law applicable in other kinds of cases to be "geographical uniformity" that satisfied the
constitutional requirement. Curiously the Court only two years earlier had recognized
in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900), that the uniformity required by Article
I, section 8, clause 1, with respect to all federal taxes is geographical in the sense that
the taxes must be imposed generally without discrimination among the states.
Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 raises again the question
whether Congress has adhered to the constitutional mandate of uniformity in its provisions regarding the allowance of exemptions. As originally passed by the House in
1978, H.R. 8200 allowed an individual debtor to choose between a catalogue of exemptions provided by section 522(d) and the exemptions provided by nonbankruptcy
law including the law of the debtor's domicile in effect on the date of the filing of the
petition. The Senate, however, insisted on restricting debtors to the exemptions available under nonbankruptcy law. The differences between the exemption provisions of
the bills passed by the two houses were resolved by a last minute compromise that
allowed an individual debtor to choose between the exemptions provided by section
522(d) and nonbankruptcy exemptions unless the state of the debtor's domicile specifically withdrew the option to choose the bankruptcy exemptions from its domiciliaries.
Thirty-six states have enacted legislation confining their domiciliaries to the exemptions provided by nonbankruptcy law. Whatever content is given the term "geographic
uniformity," it appears that the discrimination resulting from the delegation to state
legislatures made in section 522(b) cannot be reconciled with the principle declared
by Chief Justice Waite in Deckert. Although the policy and constitutionality of section
522(b) have been subjected to cogent criticism, the delegation has been sustained by
the courts that have considered challenges to its constitutionality.
Another unsuccessful attack on a Congressional exercise of the bankruptcy power
for its nonuniformity of application was made in Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins.
Corps. (The Regional Rail Reorganization Cases), 419 U.S. 102 (1974). Although the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act was restricted in its application to the railroads of a
single geographic region, the Court found no constitutional infirmity in view of the
fact that all the railroads in the United States then operating under the bankruptcy laws
were located in that single region. If the statute had been drafted in terms applicable
to railroads in all regions, the operation and effect of the statute would have been unchanged. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas dissented from the ruling on the ground that
security holders of railroads in other regions were not subject to the restrictions in a reorganization under section 77 that were imposed by the challenged act on the security
holders of the eight railroads involved in the suit.
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A nonuniformity attack on a bankruptcy law finally succeeded in Railway Labor
Executivei Assn v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982), decided by a unanimous Court
in 1982. The Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act was
a measure relieving employees of the Rock Island Railroad, which was undergoing
liquidation pursuant to the provisions of section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, from some
of the adverse consequences of the termination of the railroad's operations. The statute
was viewed in Justice Rehnquist's opinion as contravening the purpose of the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause to bar private legislation for particular
debtors. Professor William Crosskey in his exhaustive study of the bankruptcy clause's
constitutional origins had emphasized that the framers' primary concern was " to make
private 'Laws of Bankruptcy' forever impossible." Politics and the Constitution in the
History of the United States 492 (1953). Justices Marshall and Brennan disapproved the
majority's intimation that the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause prohibits legislation addressed to a single debtor's problem. They nevertheless concurred
in the judgment invalidating the statute on the ground that Congress had not justified
the special treatment of a particular problem of a single debtor. The opinion of the
Court has been criticized for its focus on an inferred hostility of the framers toward
private legislation rather than on its more manifest purpose to establish a national law
as a counteractant against diverse and conflicting state laws governing debtors' and
creditors' rights. The Court summarily rejected an argument that the act might be
sustained as an exercise of the commerce power, thus suggesting that a uniformity
requirement applies to legislation that regulates commerce if it also concerns the
subject of bankruptcy.

Conclusion
The Constitution has authorized Congress to establish uniform bankruptcy laws with
freedom to choose the means, objectives, and features of the system to be established.
The bankruptcy laws enacted as a result are far removed from the bankruptcy laws the
framers were familiar with and indeed from the bankruptcy laws to be found anywhere
else in the world before or since. While debtor relief, as distinguished from creditor
protection, may have been recognized as a permissible but strictly incidental function
or objective of bankruptcy legislation in 1787, Congress has made it the prime feature
of our bankruptcy laws. Orderly distribution of assets of insolvent debtors.- the
original and traditional role of bankruptcy - does not actually occur in most cases
administered under current bankruptcy laws in this country. Contrary to warnings of
critics and opponents of the direction taken by American bankruptcy legislation, our
bankruptcy laws have not hampered the development of the American credit economy.
Consumer credit is nowhere extended on the scale found in the United States. Coincidentally the bankruptcy laws of the United States are the most extensively used and the
most elaborate and sophisticated in the world. Although the Marathon case cited in
note 1 once threatened to bring the bankruptcy system to a halt, the system survived
that and other crises. Bankruptcy administration faces many problems, many of them
persistent and serious. The Constitution is not, however, one of the problems.

Frank R . Kennedy, the Thomas M. Cooley
Professor Emeritus at the Law School, is
well-known and widely respected for his
work on bankruptcy.
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